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Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to examine the status of democracy in Latin American 
countries as well as the prospects upcoming for the region in the present decade. We will 
provide a map of the subject that includes a basic definition of democracy, an overview of 
theories about how democracies arise and may be maintained, as a continuum, and a review 
of what we know empirically about Latin American democratization. We suggest a model 
in which political culture and social structure influence each other, and that both directly 
influence political processes, which in turn mediates between these causal factors and the 
actual emergence of democratic rules of the political game in every particular country. The 
approach is completed with a series of lapop Data that shows up how far and in what 
direction democracy is taking place in Latin America.
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Resumen: El propósito de este ensayo es examinar el estatus democrático de los países 
latinoamericanos, así como las perspectivas de avance de la democracia en la región para 
la presente década. Ofrecemos un mapa del objeto de estudio que incluye una definición 
básica de democracia, un panorama de las teorías acerca del desarrollo de la democracia y 
como ésta puede ser mantenida, como un continuum, y una revisión de lo que conocemos 
empíricamente sobre la democratización latinoamericana. Sugerimos un modelo en el cual la 
cultura política y la estructura social influyen una sobre otra, y ambas influyen directamente 
los procesos políticos, los cuales a su vez median entre éstos y el surgimiento real de reglas 
democráticas en el juego político en cada nación latinoamericana en particular. El estudio 
se completa con los datos de lapop que intentan mostrar hasta dónde y en qué dirección se 
instala la democracia en la región latinoamericana. 
Palabras clave: democracia, cultura política, estructura social, América Latina.
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Introduction
The democratization of Latin America and the status of democracy in the 
region are topics of great interest. In the 1970s, constitutional electoral 
democracy as a system of government was the exception in Latin America 
rather than the rule. Most political systems had written constitutions that 
embraced the liberal democratic principles, but many of them failed to live 
up to their own legal norms and principles. Undemocratic elites controlled 
a majority of the region’s polities, in some cases overtly ignoring legality and 
governing de facto. In others, elites paid lip service to constitutional democracy 
by enacting parodies of its forms and processes while undermining it with 
subterfuges that denied citizens a meaningful political role. The handmaid 
of both models −overt authoritarianism and democratic charade− was the 
widespread violation of human rights, employed by rulers to discourage 
meaningful citizen participation in rule.
So much has changed in Latin American politics over the four decades 
since 1970. In most of the region today constitutional, electoral democracy 
is in practice. Since the early 2000s average Latin American citizens have 
enjoyed far more say in who governs and represents them than at any previous 
time in the region’s history. Despite setbacks and wobbles and a very few 
exceptions to this new pattern, democracy as a system of government appears 
well established as the main organizing system for government throughout 
the Americas. 
Despite this institutional and practical progress, constitutional electoral 
democracy as it is practiced in Latin America today has many well-known 
flaws. The critiques of William Robinson, Peter Smith, for example, 
highlight the limitations in effective citizen input into the systems and of 
their public policy outputs (Robinson, 1996, 2003; Smith, 2005). Robinson, 
for example, labels Latin America’s governing systems “polyarchies” rather 
than democracies in order to highlight their limitations both in true citizen 
influence and in the benefits they generate for their citizens. Cognizant of the 
merits of such criticisms, it is still worth the effort to conduct an evaluation 
of the status of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. At a 
minimum one must argue that not even the harshest critics of the region’s 
democracies (or polyarchies if you wish) can deny that democratic regimes 
are less repressive than their autocratic predecessors. In effect democracies 
in the Americas kill and repress many fewer of their citizens than did the 
undemocratic governments that came before them.
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In the pages that follow we will provide a map of the subject that 
includes a basic definition of democracy, an overview of theories about how 
democracies arise and may be maintained, and a review of what we know 
empirically about Latin American democratization.
Democracy defined
The term democracy comes to us from the ancient Greeks, where rule 
(kratein) by the people (demos) was practiced in several Hellenic city states.1 
Aristotle described the characteristics of democracy as involving rule by 
the free and poor majority (of males) (Aristotle, 1962). Aristotle regarded 
democracy as a deficient form of government because of its tendency to 
abuse minorities, to be unstable, and to succumb to the wiles of demagogues. 
He argued that democratic polities were better if they adopted constitutions 
to define institutions, protect minorities from abuse by majorities and 
to provide for stability. By today’s inclusive standards of citizenship and 
human rights, the Athenian practices of slavery and exclusion of women 
from citizenship constituted additional flaws in democracy that have been 
abolished in modern democratic polities. Despite the ancient roots of these 
central features of democracy, and despite their initial limits on citizenship, 
these defining traits identified by Aristotle constitute the essence of modern 
democratic governance. Democracy refers to participation in rule by the 
majority of citizens, tempered by a constitution to protect minorities’ rights 
and promote stability.
Hellenic democratic governance eventually collapsed. Functioning 
democracy at the level of the nation state did not begin to develop for two 
millennia. Some European city states of the late Middle Ages and early 
Renaissance adopted proto-democratic features, but it was not until the 
American and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth century that modern 
democracy began to take shape. Challenging absolutist monarchism, Liberal 
theorists and social contract thinkers (including Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson 
and Rousseau) laid the foundations for the principles of equality before the 
law and popular sovereignty that undergird modern democratic theory and 
democratic political systems alike. Later, critics of capitalism and Liberalism 
on the left offered critiques that shaped efforts to promote greater economic 
1 Democracy or polities with democratic features may well have existed before Greek 
antiquity in prehistoric societies, but there is little or no record of it; for examples see 
Midlarsky (Midlarsky, 1997).
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equality in democracies (Cohen, 1973; Dahl, 1998; Held, 2001; Pateman, 
1970). Liberal constitutional proto-democracies appeared in the United 
States and Europe and Latin America in the late eighteenth and throughout 
the nineteenth centuries. Typically elites dominated these systems and the 
rules of the game excluded large parts of their populations from suffrage. 
Using inclusive citizenship as a criterion of democracy (i.e., that no major 
segments of the population be excluded from citizenship and suffrage), truly 
democratic nation states did not arise until the late nineteenth and more 
commonly the twentieth century (Doorenspleet, 2005, 2000; Huntington, 
1991). 
Conditions for democracy’s development
Transition to Democracy
What do scholars believe accounts for democratization, and how might 
their arguments relate to or explain the Latin American cases? Theoretical 
explanations about the development of democracy breaks down into 
three basic types of arguments –cultural, structural, and process− related 
theories. 
The first of these is cultural theories, which essentially posit that the 
attitudes and values of citizens determine the rules of the national political 
game. Two influential examples illustrate the approach. Seymour Martin 
Lipset, in two seminal articles and his book Political Man (Lipset, 1959a, 
1961, 1959b) argued that the relative poverty of developing nations, 
among which he included Latin American states, gave these nations large 
proportions of poor citizens who were more prone to be authoritarian than 
middle class and upper class citizens.2 Lipset believed that the presence of 
many citizens with authoritarian norms made it harder for poor countries 
to become democracies. Lipset conducted some of his research on working 
class authoritarianism in Argentina. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba made 
another famous cultural argument in their classic The Civic Culture (Almond 
and Verba, 1963). They compared public opinion data from Mexico, Italy, 
the United States, Britain and Germany. They argued that democracy lagged 
in Mexico and Italy because of an excess of “subject oriented” citizens and 
2 A major influence on Lipset was the work of Teodor Adorno et al. (Adorno, E. Frenkely-
Brunswik and Sanford, 1950), who posited the working class authoritarianism explanation 
to account for the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the 1930s.
John A. Booth and Leticia Heras-Gómez. Democracy in Latin America: status and prospects
59
a lack of sufficient “participant oriented” citizens. Other scholars have 
more recently made similar arguments for the primacy of culture in the 
construction of democracies. They include Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart, 
1990, 1988; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and Robert Putnam (Putnam, 
2000, 1993). And using this approach other authors tried to find out cultural 
inheritance in the shape of political values, such as Heras (2004) or about 
the influence of political system type in political culture values (Booth and 
Seligson, 1984).
Such cultural arguments have elicited several critiques. One is that 
cultural theories ignore fundamental social and political structures, especially 
the powerful role of political elites. This view argues that mass publics, their 
norms and numbers notwithstanding (Linz and Stepan, 1978) political 
power to determine the rules of national politics in regime change. Thus, 
considering that democracy is about mass publics governing themselves, it 
is ironic that mass publics do not themselves actually establish democratic 
regime-elites. Elite attitudes and behavior determine both the formation and 
deformation or dissolution of democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1978; Peeler, 
1998, 1992; Przeworski, 1986). Thus mass attitudes may matter little for 
democratization. There is empirical evidence, however, that low mass public 
support for democracy or high dissatisfaction with regime performance may 
trigger antidemocratic behavior by elites (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Perez, 
Booth and Seligson, 2010; Seligson and Booth, 2009).
The second critique of the cultural theories of democratization comes 
from empirical analysis of the direction of causality between cultural norms 
and regime type. Both Muller and Seligson  (1994) and Jackman and Miller 
(2004, 1996) bring multi-level data on individual norms and system traits to 
bear on this problem of the direction of influence –i.e., whether mass political 
culture shapes system rules or system rules shape culture–. They demonstrate 
that system-level rules of the political game exercise stronger influences on 
mass culture than vice versa. In essence, citizens living in autocracies adopt 
authoritarian cultural norms, and when the rules change to democracy 
public norms follow as an adaptive mechanism. The findings of both teams 
undermine arguments for the cultural determination of democracy.
If not culture, then, what does cause democratization? We are left 
with social structure, and political processes and elites. Structural theories 
of democratization range widely, but share a common idea that large-scale 
features of social systems determine the onset of democracy. Most structural 
theories emphasize how shifts in the distribution of critical material and 
organizational resources among political actors can lead to democracy. 
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Democratic regimes emerge when the level and distribution of political 
and economic resources (Gasiorowski, 2000; Lipset, 1994, 1959b; Muller, 
1997; Vanhanen, 1997) and the mobilization of resources by organized 
middle or working classes (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992) 
permit formerly excluded actors to disrupt the extant authoritarian 
coalition. Elites are more likely to allow democratization when they enjoy 
capital mobility rather than capital rigidity (such as having wealth based 
on large landholdings) (Boix, 2003; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Muller, 1997). 
Links between democracy and economic development levels are debated. 
Przeworski et al. however, argue based on their empirical analysis, that the 
development of democracy is not correlated to economic development levels. 
Nevertheless, their analysis shows that democracy’s survival does depend on 
a certain level of prosperity (Przeworski et al., 2000).
In contrast to the inward looking arguments about national economic 
features and class development, a different structural argument looks outside 
the democratizing country. Typically citing the cases of postwar Germany 
and Japan, this theory holds that democracy may be imposed upon a country 
by external actors (Whitehead, 1991). Empirical investigation of dozens of 
cases of imposed democracy reveals a fairly high rate of failure (Enterline and 
Greig, 2005, 2008).
Another approach to democratization focuses on political and 
economic elites. Key societal leaders and power holders must engineer 
specific democratic arrangements (elite settlements) and agree to operate by 
them. The broader the coalition of political forces involved, the more stable 
and consolidated a democratic regime will be. Weak elite commitment to 
constitutional democratic norms can undermine a democratic regime as 
opportunistic elites act undemocratically to seek their narrow advantage 
(Higley and Burton, 1989; Higley and Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1991; 
Karl, 1992; Peeler, 1992, 1985). Robinson’s explanation of the emergence of 
minimalist formal electoral democracy includes both structural arguments 
(global economic and political forces and institutions impinge on the local) 
and elite arguments (international and global elites cooperate to impose 
democratic rules of the game on local elites) (Robinson, 1996, 2003). 
A final approach can be labeled process theory, which examines not the 
causes of democratization, but its mechanics. These scholars, some already 
mentioned in the elite approach, often focus on the pacts that must be made 
to bring about a democratic transition,  agreements among powerful political 
actors on the terms of the new political game (Boix, 2003; Higley and 
Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 
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1986; Rustow, 1970; Stepan, 1986). Who must be involved in regime change, 
under what terms they will participate, starting points and paths forward all 
constitute topics for process theories of democratization. 
Political systems are very complex and the political relations among 
elites and between elites and masses are unlikely to be explained simply. 
Indeed, this is causal complexity suggested by the fact that various students 
of democracy cited draw upon more than one explanatory factor to account 
for the transition to democracy –some combination of culture, structure, and 
process–. Lipset, for example, emphasizes both social structure and economic 
development as causes of democratization (Lipset, 1961). Robinson views 
local and national elites as agents promoting democratization on behalf 
of the global capitalist economic development process (Robinson, 1996). 
Barrington Moore focuses on social structures such as relations between 
social classes, land tenure systems, and the behavior and resources of certain 
elites and non-elites that may lead to the emergence of democracy (Moore 
Jr., 1966). Mahoney makes similar arguments about the democratization 
of Central America (Mahoney, 2001). Higley and Burton’s elite theory of 
democratic settlements includes both processes and paths to elite pacts as well 
as the political culture of the elites who must establish the new democracies 
(Higley and Burton, 2006). Huntington ranges widely, embracing both 
elite cultural arguments and process theories (Huntington, 1991). Thus I 
suspect that several or even all of these factors are involved, likely in various 
combinations case by case, in the democratization of Latin America.
Figure 13 shows a theoretical model that suggests possible inter-
relationships among the theoretical explanations for democratization. The 
solid blue arrows indicate likely causal influences from one factor toward 
each other factor and toward democracy (see figure 1). 
What Figure 1 and the empirical literature about democratization 
(see below) suggest is that political culture and social structure influence 
each other, and that both directly influence political processes, which in 
turn mediates between these causal factors and the actual emergence of 
democratic rules of the political game in a particular country. That solves 
the obvious problem that social classes or the values of individuals cannot 
actually fashion a democratic regime. Rather, elites put together political 
processes that establish democracies when they elect to do so or are forced 
to do so by public opinion/culture and by structural pressures. Culture and 
structure may directly influence democratization, but that seems less likely 
3 All the figures and the table are in the Annex, at the end of this article.
Convergencia Revista de Ciencias Sociales, núm. 67, 2015, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México
62
than an elite-mediated process. There are also likely feedback channels in the 
model, by which the existence of democracy alters both political culture and 
social structures. Such feedback systems may be very important to democratic 
consolidation.
Acquiring democracy is one thing and as it is now manifest, the theories 
about it are complex; sustaining democracy once it exists –democratic 
consolidation– is yet another. This is the topic to which we now turn.
Consolidation of democracy
Consolidation of democracy refers to keep democracy going once it is 
established, and to deepen the commitment of players in the democratic 
political game to the game’s maintenance (Diamond, 1999; Przeworski, 1986; 
Rustow, 1970). Theories of democratic consolidation may be categorized 
similarly to those of the transition to democracy, according to whether 
they focus on political culture, social structure and political institutions, or 
political processes.
The most prominent structural argument for democratic consolidation 
is that once a country reaches a certain level of economic development it is 
much more likely to become and remain a democracy. Empirical research 
indicated that there was an economic threshold for stable democracy 
(Lipset, 1961; Seligson, 1987). The most prominent work in this regard is by 
Przeworski et al., who contend that economic development does not matter 
for the transition to democracy, but that it matters for democracy’s survival. 
Once democratic regimes attain a certain level of economic development, 
empirical evidence suggests that they do not break down or lose their 
democratic status. 
Another approach to consolidation is a process theory based on elites 
and their role in keeping democracy. This argument is that the broader the 
coalition that forges an elite settlement on democracy, the more likely it is 
to be stable and long lasting (Higley and Burton, 2006; Higley and Burton, 
1989; Higley and Gunther, 1992). The explanation for this is that in a regime 
in which most national political and economic elites agree on democratic 
rules of the game, the less likely it is that dissatisfied counter-elites will 
challenge the regime, and the more likely that the regime will survive if 
challenged (Peeler, 1998, 1992; Przeworski, 1986). 
Cultural arguments about democratic consolidation usually affirm that 
large proportions of mass publics need to prefer democratic governance 
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or embrace a democratic regime (Diamond, 1999; Lipset, 1959a; Norris, 
1999; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998). Robert Putnam argues that social 
capital, a combination of interconnectedness in groups and networks (civil 
society) and of interpersonal trust and other democracy-supporting norms, 
is essential to keep democracy. He has examined the apparent decline of 
social capital in the United States and expressed fear that it is eroding as face-
to-face interactions among Americans have declined in the late twentieth 
century (Putnam, 2000, 1995). Seligson has linked the decline of trust in 
political institutions in recent decades to the erosion of voter turnout in 
Costa Rica, the oldest continuous democracy in Latin America (Seligson, 
2002). 
Some cultural theories of consolidation or democratic survival are more 
complex. One argues that particular combinations of critical attitudes among 
mass publics are essential to democracy’s survival. For example, working on 
the assumption that mass values constrain political system elites, Seligson 
and others have argued that two attitudes matter –political tolerance and 
support for institutions–.4 They contend that the greater the fraction of a 
country’s population that affirms positive support for both at the same 
time, the greater the likelihood that democracy will survive (Booth, 2010; 
Córdova and Cruz, 2007; Perez and Seligson, 2008; Seligson et al., 2006). 
Other configurations are likely to tend toward unstable democracy, unstable 
authoritarianism, or stable authoritarianism. Booth and Seligson choose a 
somewhat different configuration of attitudes. They argue that when the 
number and ratio of citizens who support democracy, positively evaluate 
institutions, and approve of the government’s economic performance are 
greater, system stability will be enhanced (Booth and Seligson, 2009). 
These are some of the major theories about democratization and 
the consolidation of democracy. Because both democratization and the 
maintenance of democratic systems are quite complex social processes, it 
appears unlikely that any single or simple explanation would be sufficient to 
account for all cases. 
The remainder of this paper turns to an assessment of the status of 
democratization and democratic consolidation in Latin America.
It is worth to add that we embraced the notion of a scalar view of 
democracy, rather than a binary or dichotomy notion of democracy 
4 See, for example, works by Seligson and his collaborators, including Booth, Córdova and 
Cruz, and Pérez and Seligson (Booth, 2010; Córdova and Cruz, 2007; Perez and Seligson, 
2008; Seligson et al., 2006). 
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(Bernhagen, 2009), meaning that democratization is a continuum from a 
certain point of departure, which would be an authoritarian regime, to a 
certain political threshold which would be a consolidated democracy. We 
also sustain with some scholars (Dahl, 1989; Hyland, 1995) that as a scalar 
concept “…would enable us to place any political system on a scale of more 
or less democracy” (Hyland, 1995; in Bernhagen, 2009: 27). Our study 
pays attention to this sort of measuring continuum of democracy in Latin 
America, because it would be very difficult to consider some countries as 
full or consolidated democracies and some as non-democracies, as the reader 
could grasp in the next pages.
An overview of Latin America’s democratization
Latin America had several brief instances of political inclusion of mass 
publics in independence movements and the founding elections of newly 
independent states. But after those episodes Latin American nations quickly 
fell under the control of landed elites who excluded mass publics from 
politics for extended periods. A handful of proto-democracies with narrowly 
based election systems arose in Latin America in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica) but even the 
most successful of those limited electoral democracies experienced reversals 
and breakdowns and episodes of military intervention in politics (Booth, 
1998; Gil, 1966; Molina, 2005; Nohlen, 1992, 2005, 1993; Peeler, 1985; 
Schneider, 2007; Smith, 1974). True constitutional, electoral democracies 
did not become successfully established in Latin America until after World 
War II; most of them have appeared only since the 1970s (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2008; Martz, 1967; Peeler, 1998; Schneider, 2007; Smith, 2005). 
Figure 2 graphs the number of democracies, autocracies and anocracies in 
the Americas (excluding the United States and Canada) at 10-year intervals 
from 1946 to 20085 (see Figure 2).
As it is seen (Figure 2) Polity IV classifies only 2 regimes in the region 
as democracies in 1946, and 5 as autocracies, with 13 anocracies (regimes 
5 These designations of regime types are those used by the Polity IV Project to characterize 
governments (Marshall and Jaggers, 2008). Polity IV employs a 21 point scale ranging in 
one point intervals from -10 (completely autocratic) to +10 (completely democratic). Any 
system with a score of -6 to -10 is classified as an autocracy; any system with a score of +6 to 
+10 is classified as a democracy. Those systems in between (from -5 to +5) are classified as 
anocracies, and possess some characteristics of both.
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somewhere in between autocracy and democracy). Some interesting things 
transpire after that. The number of anocracies declines fairly steadily until 
about 1985, after which it varies from 1 to 4. The number of autocratic 
regimes increases until 1975, demonstrating that several governments 
became less democratic in the three decades following World War II. After 
then, however, the number of autocracies falls from ten in 1975 to only one 
by 1995, and remains at that level (the autocracy persisting, of course, is 
Cuba). The small number of democracies rises to 7 by 1965, declines to 6 
in 1975, but then takes off and doubling by 1985. The most democracies 
observed are 21 (of the 25 nations included at these decade intervals) and is 
recorded in 2005. 
To employ Huntington’s phrase, Latin America clearly participated in a 
wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) that had two phases, a tentative 
one in the 1960s followed by reversals or democratic breakdowns, and then 
a much stronger democratization wave in the 1980s and 1990s.6 A grand 
question at present is whether the reversals observed in the last few years 
constitute a reverse wave of democratic breakdown. To put it otherwise, 
have Latin America’s electoral democracies consolidated? The Venezuelan 
case continues to trouble observers. Its increased restrictions on rights and 
liberties and the removal of many constitutional restraints on the executive 
caused Venezuela to be downgraded by Polity IV in 2007 to an anocracy. 
Another questionable case is Ecuador, which Polity IV also downgraded to 
an anocracy in 2007 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2008); yet another country, not 
accounted for in figure 1 is, Honduras, which in June 2009 had a coup d’état. 
A de facto civilian government ruled the country until a new government was 
elected and inaugurated following the regularly scheduled December 2009 
elections. 
The large number of transformations to democracy of Latin America, 
from the 1970s until Mexico’s full emergence as a new member of the club 
in 2000, is a remarkable historical process. It invites an obvious question of 
why so many countries moved in the same political direction within such a 
6 Huntington placed these developments in his third wave of democratization. Doorenspleet 
(2000) recalculated the wave phenomenon using a tougher criterion for identifying 
democracies (Huntington employed 50% male suffrage to qualify for democracy, while 
Doorenspleet insisted on broadly inclusive citizenship and suffrage and more careful 
attention to the number of countries in the world). Doorenspleet’s data essentially make 
Huntington’s first wave disappear, and thus locates Latin American democratization in a 
second wave.
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short time span. For some ideas about what might have happened it is useful 
to consider democratization theories.
Empirical evidence about democratization in Latin America
The next part attempts to provide empirical evidence and data about 
democratization and democratic consolidation in Latin America. Regarding 
cultural values, empirical evidence is not strong for the whole region. There 
are few approaches like Booth and Seligson (1984, 1994) who found 
support for democracy in Mexico and Nicaragua in pre-democratic stages. 
Nonetheless evidence about processes (elite pact and waves of democracy) 
is more abundant. We have well known study cases such as Colombia 1958, 
Venezuela 1959, El Salvador 1992, Guatemala 1996 (Huntington, 1991; 
Peeler, 1998; Karl, 1992), based on pact elites negotiation that renders 
stability. Waves of democracy can be seen graphically in Figure 3. 
There was clearly a major wave from mid eighties up to the first decade 
of the new century (see also Smith, 2005), and a minor wave in the mid fifties 
up to the mid sixties. 
Regarding social structure, we found out evidences in both sides. 
First, there is a positive relationship between economic development and 
mobilization of working and middle classes and democracy, at least they are 
associated with democratization (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Also for all 
developing countries (global sample) the per capita gdp is positively related 
with democratization (Epstein et al., 2006), who contradicts Przeworski et 
al. (2000). 
At the same time, there is limited direct relation, between economic 
development as a whole in Latin America, but a positive one between 
industrialization and literacy and democratization. We can also observe 
a positive relation between broader distribution of power resources and 
democratization in Latin America and globally (Vanhanen, 1997).
Concerning democratic consolidation, theories based on culture show 
that high levels of democratic values tend to support democratic practices, as 
it can be seen through some new evidence from lapop 2010 (study of 40000 
respondents across the Americas). 
With regard to processes, in terms of democratic consolidation, many 
case studies and histories of elite pacts in Latin America can be found. 
Additionally, looking at aggregate data, we can observe in Figure 4 that 
people all over America reveal support for democracy with above 50%, and 
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none of them show less than 60%. However, in 11 out of 25 countries this 
support declined in only two years from 2008 to 2010 (see Figure 4).
We can also observe that tolerance to criticisms against the system 
performs levels between 43% (Haiti) up to 66.7% (Costa Rica) and more 
importantly, most countries are getting closer to 50%, including Bolivia, 
Honduras, Peru and Dominican Republic, which are just adjusting their 
political system to democratic practices; and in the case of Mexico (49.2%) 
it can be seen as the result of a long lasting authoritarian regime; Figure 5 
shows these data.
However, the number of citizens who support democratic institutions 
remains lower than tolerance to the system criticisms. The percentage 
comes from 44% (Trinity and Tobago) up to only 68% (Uruguay).7 Most 
countries are located from forties to sixties. This may be considered a gradual 
confidence in institutions on behalf of the citizenry. Figure 6 shows data per 
country (see Figure 6).
Another feature to consider is the combination of tolerance to critics 
and support for the system (support for institutions). What can be seen 
is a general upward tendency towards tolerance and an initial disposition 
to support institutions. Critical cases in Latin America are Paraguay, Peru, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, which can be an evidence of very early stages of 
tolerance and support for institutions (see Figure 7).
One last measure of democratic consolidation is the “Level of Triple 
Satisfaction”, which is the combination index calculated on the basis of being 
above or below the midpoint of institutions support, support of democratic 
principles and evaluation of government’s economic performance 
(0=dissatisfied with all, 50=Mixed, 100= satisfied with all). By 2010, this 
index surpassed 50% in most Latin American countries; only Guatemala, 
Peru, Belize and Jamaica persisted behind this line. This triple satisfaction 
index could picture that in Latin America, at least by 2000, people were 
expecting a better performance from the democratic regime, not just 
electoral features, but also a better economic performance (see Figure 8). 
It may be an optimistic view, but according to these data, democracy 
is slowly but consistently becoming solid in Latin America. Prospects for 
democracy will be examined in the next part.
7 The case of Haiti can be considered as a very particular performance towards democracy, 
being one of the last countries to embrace pro-democratic institutions and practices. 
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Prospects for democracy in Latin America
Some considerations must be done to the threats and challenges of Latin 
American democracy. First of all the deterioration of restrictions on the 
executive power have to be taken into account (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua); truly undemocratic events such as the coup in Honduras in 
2009; police uprising in Ecuador, and “the pact” in Nicaragua fsln-plc. 
In addition, we have to consider the erosion of democracy scores in Latin 
America, as well as the possibility of a backward wave, and finally the 
sharp economic downturn of 2008-2009 in a possible negative impact on 
democratic values (see Figure 9).
Also recent trends in the index of the “triple satisfaction” 2008-2010, 
shows that 14 of 22 cases increased, and it moved down in 5 —Belize, Mexico, 
Argentina, Dominican Republic and Colombia— and that it is very low in 
Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, and Guatemala; (see Table 1). This table 
confirms that there is not a general trend about satisfaction with democracy 
as a whole (institutional, economic performance and a normative system) 
in Latin America, and that two years of negative performance can have an 
impact in the prospects for democracy (see Figure 10).
Conclusions
This approach to the status and prospects to democracy in Latin America 
enables us to develop Table 1.
We see countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and, of course, 
Honduras still struggling with institutional problems; countries with 
persistent low levels of democratic values, such as Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Jamaica; and finally countries with an erosion of democratic values (dynamics) 
such as Mexico, Argentina and Belize. Good news is that no country appears 
in the 3 lists, which allows us to confirm that most Latin American countries 
do not portray major problems; even though some countries are still carrying 
on with difficulties. 
To conclude it can be said that theories of democratization and 
consolidation are showing certain progress. We can also conclude that 
empirical evidence about Latin America is achieving major levels, but this 
evidence varies by subject, and so are the prospects for democracy which are 
by and large mixed.
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The configurations of attitudes which maintain democracy in some 
countries had set backs, as well as elites are threatening institutions in 
some countries. However, democratic values are generally strong and have 
withstood the economic shock.
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Figure 5
Percentage of citizens tolerant to the system critics, 2010
(Black line=50%)
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Figure 6
Percentage of citizens who support institutions
(Black line=50%)
Source: Americas Barometer by lapop.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Haití 




















































Convergencia Revista de Ciencias Sociales, núm. 67, 2015, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México
80
Figure 7
Percentage of citizens who support the rights of critics and institutions at a time
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Figure 8
Levels of Triple Satisfaction, 2010
(Black line=50%)
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Figure 10
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Table 1
 Institutional Problems Low levels of democratic values 
Dynamics (erosion of 
democratic values) 
Venezuela Guatemala Mexico 
Ecuador Paraguay Argentina 
Nicaragua Jamaica Belize 
Honduras 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Leticia Heras Gómez is a researcher at the Faculty of Political Sciences in 
the Autonomous University of the State of Mexico. Her research topics 
are Political participation in Mexico and Latin America, Political Culture 
in Mexico and Latin America, and regional democratization. Her last 
publications are “Confidence in electoral institutions in Mexico: the ife 
under the citizen regard”, in the Revista Debates (ufrgs, Brazil, vol. 5, 2011) 
and “An approach to political party membership: the case of emergent 
parties” in Convergencia, Revista de Ciencias Sociales (20, Mexico, no. 63, 
Sept-Dec, 2013).
John Booth is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University 
of North Texas. He is an acknowledge specialist of political culture and 
political participation in Latin America, as well as democratization and 
political violence in the area. He is author with Michell Seligson of The 
Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Support and Democracy in eight nations 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) and along with Thomas Walker and 
Christine Wade of Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, 
and Change (Westview Press, 2006).
Reception: October 22nd, 2012.
Approval: June 20th, 2013.
